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S/1996/1033
11 December 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 11 DECEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 11 December 1996 addressed to you by Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, concerning the continuing violations of Iraq's territory and airspace by Turkish armed forces.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 11 December 1996 from the Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

I refer to my letter of 5 December 1996 concerning continuing violations of the territory and airspace of the Republic of Iraq by Turkish armed forces (S/1996/1018, annex) and should like to inform you that, on a variety of pretexts, such forces are still engaging in military operations inside Iraq's territory and in its airspace. The particulars are set forth hereunder.

1. On 31 October 1996 Turkish fighter aircraft bombarded the Karfiyah area, which is inside Iraqi territory in the south-eastern part of Amadiyah district, killing two local residents and injuring 15.

2. On 4 November 1996 two Turkish fighter aircraft bombarded the Karfiyah and Sidah areas, which are inside Iraqi territory in the eastern part of Amadiyah district, killing two local residents.

3. On 7 November 1996 a Turkish airborne force in two helicopters landed in the Mazuri area, which is inside Iraqi territory in the Shirwan-Mazin sector, seizing 10 local residents and taking them to Turkish territory.

4. On 7 November 1996 Turkish fighter aircraft bombarded outlying areas of the Shirwan-Mazin sector inside Iraqi territory.

5. On 7 November 1996 Turkish aircraft bombarded the Iraqi villages of Mirgah Sur and Mirani, killing 22 local residents.

6. On 9 November 1996 a Turkish military force consisting of a special-forces battalion reinforced by detachments of the Turkish village gendarmerie crossed Iraqi territory and searched the Iraqi villages of Rusi and Akmalah.

7. On 9 November 1996 two Turkish fighter aircraft bombarded the Nirwah and Rikan sector, which is inside Iraqi territory.

8. On 10 November 1996 two Turkish fighter aircraft bombarded the Iraqi villages of Qamari, Kalka, Haysi and Bazi. A local woman was injured in the attack.

9. On 15 November 1996 Turkish artillery shelled the Shiladizah centre, which is inside Iraqi territory, destroying the home of one resident and thus killing him and his five children and injuring his wife.

10. On 15 November 1996 Turkish artillery shelled the Shiladizah centre. A shell fell on the home of one Husayn Khalid, killing the children Aksar Fattah Khalid, Yunus Husayn Khalid, Asiya Mind Fattah and Jayman Fattah Khalid.

11. Between 1053 and 1200 hours on 18 November 1996 four sorties by Turkish fighter aircraft were detected in Iraqi airspace in the northern region in the Zakho and Amadiyah areas.

12. Between 1008 and 1342 hours on 26 November 1996 six sorties by Turkish fighter aircraft were detected in the Iraqi airspace in the Amadiyah, Pibu and Batufah areas.

13. On 28 November 1996 a Turkish military force consisting of a special-forces company reinforced by detachments of the Turkish village gendarmerie estimated at some 400 in number crossed the Iraqi border and searched the Iraqi villages of Urah, Baydu, Awi and Kani Masi to the north-east of Amadiyah.

In conveying to you the details of these Turkish violations, the Government of Iraq calls for an immediate and thorough investigation of the incidents in question. It does so because the practices of the Turkish forces, as represented by their repeated shelling of towns and villages in Iraq and their unlawful incursions into Iraqi territory, are in flagrant violation of Iraq's sovereignty and the inviolability of its territory and airspace, just as they are incompatible with relations of good-neighbourliness, the Charter of the United Nations, the norms of international law and the 1926 Iraq-Turkey boundary agreement. These practices may also undermine stability in the region as a whole, which is suffering primarily from the anomalous situation created by the Americans and their allies in northern Iraq.

The anomalous situation in northern Iraq, which is being maintained by the United States of America by means of brute force, and the deployment of United States and British strike forces in Turkish territory are preventing the two neighbours from resolving the issues that are hampering relations between them. They also pose a threat to international peace and security in the region and in the world at large.

As stated in my previous letter, the Turkish Government bears full international responsibility for its acts of aggression inside Iraqi territory and for all their consequences, regardless of the alleged reasons it gives.

The Government of Iraq reserves its legitimate right under international law to seek compensation for the damage caused by these Turkish violations of its territory and its airspace and for the human suffering inflicted on Iraqi citizens by these actions. Through you, it renews its call to the Government of Turkey to reconsider its policy with respect to the situation in northern Iraq, to promote the collaboration of the two countries on the basis of good-neighbourliness and mutual respect for sovereignty and to eliminate the reasons for the persistence of a situation that jeopardizes the interests of both countries.

As, through you, I reiterate my country's call to its Turkish neighbours to respect Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity, I express the hope that the United Nations will meet its responsibilities as laid down in the Charter and that it will halt the intimidation and aggression to which my country is constantly being subjected.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Tariq AZIZ
Deputy Prime Minister and
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq

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S/1996/1034
11 December 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 DECEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SIERRA LEONE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the attached document entitled "Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone" to be circulated as a document of the Security Council (see annex).

(Signed) James O. C. JONAH
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, signed at Abidjan on 30 November 1996

The Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL).

Moved by the imperative need for a just and durable peace in Sierra Leone;

Inspired by the equally imperative need for genuine national unity and reconciliation to end the fratricidal war in Sierra Leone;

Committed to promoting popular participation in governance and full respect for human rights and humanitarian laws;

Dedicated to the advancement of democratic development and to the maintenance of a socio-political order free of inequality, nepotism and corruption;

Determined to foster mutual confidence and trust;

Convinced that a sense of common purpose and patriotism is the need of the hour;

Hereby agree as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The armed conflict between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL is hereby ended with immediate effect. Accordingly, the two sides will ensure that a total cessation of hostilities is observed forthwith.

ARTICLE 2

The Government and the RUF/SL undertake that no effort shall be spared to effect the scrupulous respect and implementation of the provisions contained in this Peace Agreement to ensure that the establishment and consolidation of a just peace becomes a priority in Sierra Leone.

ARTICLE 3

A national body to be known as the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace shall be established within two weeks of the signing of this Agreement. The Commission shall be a verification mechanism responsible for supervising and monitoring the implementation of and compliance with all the provisions contained in this Peace Agreement.

The Commission, in fulfilment of this task during the period of consolidating the peace, shall coordinate and facilitate the work of the following bodies which it will proceed to establish:

(i) Socio-Economic Forum;

(ii) Citizen's Consultative Conferences;

(iii) Multi-partisan Council;

(iv) Trust Fund for the Consolidation of Peace;

(v) Demobilizations and Resettlement Committee;

(vi) National Budget and Debt Committee.

The Commission shall comprise representatives of the Government and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, drawing on the resources of State and civic institutions as and when necessary.

The Commission shall have the power to recommend the preparation of enabling measures necessary for the implementation and development of the provisions contained in this Peace Agreement. It shall have the power to issue publicly its conclusions. The parties undertake to comply with the conclusions of the Commission.

The Commission shall have the power to prepare preliminary legislative drafts necessary for the implementation and development of the provisions contained in the present Peace Agreement.

The Parties undertake to consult the Commission before taking decisions on measures relating to the present Peace Agreement.

The Commission may similarly consult the Parties at the highest level whenever it is appropriate.

The Commission shall have access to and may inspect any activity or site connected with the implementation of the present Peace Agreement. The Commission shall have full powers to organize its work in the manner in which it deems most appropriate and to appoint any group or subcommittee which it may deem useful in the discharge of its functions.

The Commission shall have its own offices, adequate communication facilities and adequate secretariat support staff.

A Trust Fund for the Consolidation of Peace shall be established to provide funding for the implementation of the present Peace Agreement.

ARTICLE 4

Citizens' Consultative Conferences shall be organized once a year, the first of which shall be organized within one hundred and twenty days of the signing of the present Peace Agreement in order to encourage people's participation and to invite recommendations for the formulation of guidelines and their implementation that will ensure truly fair and representative political processes.

ARTICLE 5

The disarmament of combatants will be effected upon their entry into the designated assembly zones, and demobilization and reintegration as soon as practicable thereafter.

The upkeep and welfare of the encamped combatants shall be the primary responsibility of the Government of Sierra Leone in conjunction with the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, assisted by the international community.

ARTICLE 6

The Parties commit themselves to a well-planned national effort on encampment, disarmament, demobilization and resettlement linked to national development objectives. To that end, a Demobilization and Resettlement Committee shall be established within a month of the signing of the present Peace Agreement.

The Committee shall coordinate the encampment, disarmament, demobilization and resettlement of RUF/SL combatants. The Committee shall work in coordination with all the relevant institutions and agencies.

Both Parties shall consult on the nomination of the membership of the Committee which shall not exceed seven persons.

The Committee shall be provided with adequate funding.

ARTICLE 7

The Demobilization and Resettlement Committee shall identify assembly zones and camp areas for RUF/SL combatants where they shall be registered, encamped and disarmed. The movement into the Assembly Zones shall commence within one month of the signing of this Agreement and be completed as soon as practicable but no later than three months from this date.

ARTICLE 8

The Parties shall request the international community to help supervise and monitor the encampment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes. The Joint Monitoring Group shall have observers at any of these processes.

ARTICLE 9

The Commission shall, as a priority, make recommendations on the restructuring and reorientation of the military as well as its leadership. In this context, members of the RUF/SL who may wish to be part of the country's military can become part of the new unified armed forces within a framework to be discussed and agreed upon by the Commission.

ARTICLE 10

The Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure the return to barracks of those units of the army not required for normal security duties and the downsizing of the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone (RSLMF), taking into account the security needs of the country.

ARTICLE 11

A Neutral Monitoring Group (NMG) from the international community shall be responsible for monitoring breaches of the ceasefire provided under this Peace Agreement.

Both Parties upon signing this Agreement shall request the international community to provide neutral monitors.

Such monitors when deployed shall be in position for an initial period of three months.

The Neutral Monitoring Group shall report any violations of the ceasefire to its headquarters which shall in turn communicate the same to the headquarters of the Joint Monitoring Group comprising of representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF based in Freetown.

ARTICLE 12

The Executive Outcomes shall be withdrawn five weeks after the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group (NMG). As from the date of the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group, the Executive Outcomes shall be confined to barracks under the supervision of the Joint Monitoring Group and the Neutral Monitoring Group. Government shall use all its endeavours, consistent with its treaty obligations, to repatriate other foreign troops no later than three months after the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group or six months after the signing of the Peace Agreement, whichever is earlier.

ARTICLE 13

The Parties agree that immediately following the signing of the present Peace Agreement, the RUF/SL shall commence to function as a political movement with the rights, privileges and duties provided by law; and that within thirty days, following that, the necessary conditions shall be created to enable the RUF/SL to register as a political movement according to law.

ARTICLE 14

To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconciliation, the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action is taken against any member of the RUF/SL in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of that organization up to the time of the signing of this Agreement. In addition, legislative and other measures necessary to guarantee former RUF/SL combatants, exiles and other persons, currently outside the country for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be adopted ensuring the full exercise of their civil and political rights, with a view to their reintegration within a framework of full legality.

ARTICLE 15

The mandate and membership of the existing National Unity and Reconciliation Commission shall be expanded in consultation with the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace to enable it to undertake a sustained and effective campaign of civic education aimed at enhancing national unity and reconciliation, taking into account the imperative need to heal the wounds of the conflict.

ARTICLE 16

The Parties agree that the standards of accountability, integrity and probity in the public services of Sierra Leone shall be raised. To that end, immediate steps shall be taken to establish the office of Ombudsman to promote the implementation of a professional code of ethics, and the integrity and patriotism of all public servants. It shall also seek to eradicate all forms of corruption.

ARTICLE 17

The Parties shall approach the international community with a view to mobilizing resources which will be used to establish a trust fund to enable the RUF/SL to transform itself into a political party.

ARTICLE 18

The Parties agree to the principle of reforming the present electoral process in Sierra Leone. There shall, in that regard, be the full participation of citizens and their organizations in formulating electoral reforms.

The independence and integrity of the National Electoral Commission shall be guaranteed to ensure fair and acceptable electoral exercise.

In reconstituting the National Electoral Commission, the President shall consult all political parties and movements including the RUF/SL to determine the membership and terms of reference of that Commission, paying particular attention to the need for a level playing field in the nation's electoral politics.

Both the Government and the RUF/SL shall, together with other political parties, nominate men and women of professionalism, integrity and objectivity to the National Electoral Commission, not later than three months after the signing of the present Peace Agreement.

It is hereby agreed that no member of the National Electoral Commission shall be eligible for appointment to a political office by any government formed as a result of an election they were mandated to conduct.

ARTICLE 19

The Parties agree that the basic civil and political liberties which are recognized by the Sierra Leone legal system and are contained in the Declarations and Principles on Human Rights adopted by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, especially the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, shall be fully guaranteed and promoted within Sierra Leone society.

These include the right to life and liberty, freedom from torture; the right to a fair trial, freedom of conscience, expression and association, and the right to take part in the governance of one's country.

To foster national reconciliation and ensure the full and unrestricted participation of the RUF/SL in the political process, the RUF/SL shall enjoy:

(i) Freedom of the press and access to the media in order that they may be heard and informed.

(ii) Freedom of association, expression, assembly and the right to mobilize and demonstrate freely, and to communicate politically in order that they may organize effectively and set up appropriate infrastructure.

All political prisoners and prisoners of war, if any, shall be released.

ARTICLE 20

To monitor compliance with the basic rights guaranteed in the present Peace Agreement, as well as to promote human rights education throughout the various sectors of Sierra Leonean society, including schools, the media, the police and the military, an independent National Commission on Human Rights shall be established.

In pursuance of the above, technical and material assistance may be sought from the United Nations Special Commission on Human Rights, the United Nations Centre for Human Rights, the African Commission on Human and the People's Rights and other relevant international organizations.

The National Commission on Human Rights shall have the power to investigate human rights violations and to institute legal proceedings where appropriate.

Further, a consortium of local human rights groups shall be encouraged to help monitor human rights observance.

ARTICLE 21

The Parties undertake to respect the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.

ARTICLE 22

In the pursuit of the reconstruction, rehabilitation and socio-economic development of Sierra Leone as a matter of the utmost priority, special attention shall be given to rural and urban poor areas, war victims, disabled persons and other vulnerable groups. The Government in conjunction with the Committee for Demobilization and Resettlement shall cooperate with all political parties and movements, including the RUF/SL, to raise resources internationally for these objectives during the initial phase of the consolidation of peace.

ARTICLE 23

The Government shall do all in its power to mobilize resources internally and externally to meet the needs of post-war reconstruction and socio-economic development.

ARTICLE 24

The Parties agree that the independence of the judiciary shall be strengthened in accordance with its role of ensuring the fair and impartial dispensation of justice in a democratic order. The composition of the present Judicial and Legal Service Commission shall be determined so as to ensure the independence of the judiciary from the other organs of State as well as the political parties. Its membership shall include, in addition to judges and

representatives of the legal profession and public services, representatives of other sectors of society not directly connected with the administration of justice.

ARTICLE 25

The Police Force shall be strengthened to ensure that the rule of law is upheld throughout Sierra Leone. To that end, the present Police Force shall be vetted. Furthermore, the professional training of the Police Force shall henceforth assure a new orientation, by emphasizing professionalism, the importance of human dignity and democratic values and respect and protection of human rights. It shall, further, emphasize that the conduct of members of the Police Force shall be free from all partisan considerations of politics, ideology and social position and that the Police Force shall avoid and combat corruption.

Nominations for the Police Council will come from wider sectors of society prior to their appointment so as to ensure their truly civilian and non-partisan character.

ARTICLE 26

It is recognized that there is a socio-economic dimension to the conflict which must also be addressed in order to consolidate the foundation of the peace. Accordingly, the socio-economic policy of Sierra Leone shall be guided among other things, by the following principles, taking into account available resources:

(i) Enhancement of the nation's productive capacity through meaningful grassroots participation in the reconstruction and development of the country;

(ii) The provision of equal opportunities to all Sierra Leoneans especially those in the countryside and the urban poor, with the aim of equitable distribution of the nation's resources thereby empowering them to contribute effectively to decision-making and implementation of policies which affect their lives;

(iii) Improving the quality of life of the people through the provision of inter alia,

a. Primary health care in all villages and towns;

b. Affordable and quality housing, especially in the countryside and poor urban areas;

c. Improved educational services to enable all children of primary and junior-secondary school age to receive free and compulsory schooling as well as provide the opportunity for the youth and

all other Sierra Leoneans to receive affordable quality education;

d. Clean drinking water and a sewerage system in every village and town;

e. Provide job opportunities in a systematic and sustainable way for the people, especially the youth;

f. Promote and sustain rural development and support agriculture in terms of technical, credit and marketing facilities;

g. Provide support for production and provision of basic food and nutritional requirements of the people and food security in general;

h. Protect the environment and regulate the exploitation of natural resources in the interest of the people, as well as prohibit monopolies;

i. Provide the required infrastructure such as roads, transport and communications, energy and rural electrification, for improved living conditions, especially of the rural people;

j. Seek to obtain debt relief in order to transfer funds from debt servicing to meet the urgent requirements of rebuilding a war-torn society.

ARTICLE 27

A broad-based socio-economic forum, in which the RUF/SL shall participate, shall be established with a view to enriching policy formulation and execution in the socio-economic sector.

ARTICLE 28

The Government of Côte d'Ivoire, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the Commonwealth shall stand as moral guarantors that this Peace Agreement is implemented with integrity and in good faith by both parties.

Annex to this Agreement:

A nationwide sensitization programme for the peace process shall be pursued by the Parties, using all available means of communication to impress upon their combatants and the nation at large:

- The fact that hostilities have ended;

- The reasons for demobilization;

- The opportunities for reintegration of combatants;

- The need for reconciliation and lasting peace.

Done in Abidjan this 30th day of the month of November 1996.

(Signed) Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan KABBAH
President of the Republic of
Sierra Leone

(Signed) Corporal Foday Saybana SANKOH
Leader of the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF)

(Signed) Henri Konan BEDIE
President of the Republic of
Côte d'Ivoire

(Signed) Berhanu DINKA
Special Envoy of the United Nations
Secretary-General for Sierra Leone

(Signed) Adwoa COLEMAN
Representative of the Organization
of African Unity (OAU)

(Signed) Moses ANAFU
Representative of the Commonwealth
Organization

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Fifty-first session
Agenda item 16
APPOINTMENT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 10 December 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the letter dated 10 December 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning the regional rotation of the post of the Secretary-General (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 16, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Anatoli M. ZLENKO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Ukraine to the United Nations

Annex

Letter dated 10 December 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Recently, in connection with the issue of the appointment of the Secretary-General, which is currently under consideration, the problem of the regional rotation of the highest political and administrative post in the United Nations has become a matter of principle.

In this context, your statement of 4 December 1996 on behalf of the Security Council is of special importance. In it, you pointed out the priority right of the African group and individual African countries to recommend their candidatures for the post of the Secretary-General. Thus the Security Council has confirmed the existence de facto of the rotation principle which has already become an inalienable constituting part and normal practice of the organization and conduct of activities in the framework of the United Nations, including the elections of its chief executive officer.

In this regard, I wish to draw your attention to the fact that for more than half a century of the United Nations history, it is only the Eastern European regional group that has never had its representative elected to this post of high responsibility. Therefore, in its position Ukraine proceeds from the understanding that at the next elections of the Secretary-General, to be held in 2001, the Security Council will show its consistency and reconfirm the priority right of the above-mentioned group of countries, which has substantially increased in number, to submit their candidatures.

I would be very grateful if you could circulate this letter among the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Anatoli M. ZLENKO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Ukraine to the United Nations

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1996/1036
12 December 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 DECEMBER 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the statement of 1 November 1996 (S/PRST/1996/44) in which the President of the Security Council, inter alia, recorded the Security Council's full support for my initiative in sending Mr. Raymond Chrétien as my Special Envoy to the Great Lakes region.

My Special Envoy has today delivered his report to me. I have pleasure in enclosing a copy and requesting you to make it available to the members of the Security Council.

I am giving urgent consideration to the assessment and recommendations which the report contains. I will convey my own views to the Security Council as soon as possible.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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Annex

Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to the Great Lakes region

(5 November-4 December 1996)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. When I left Washington on 5 November as your Special Envoy to the Great Lakes region, a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented proportion was unfolding in eastern Zaire. Intense fighting between Zairian troops and rebels had caused the evacuation of all international humanitarian workers and forced hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced Zairians to flee amidst alarming accounts of intimidation and killings and accusations by Zaire that Rwanda, with the help of Uganda, was waging a war on its territory. There was also pressure for immediate action from the media, the humanitarian community and the public at large. It was under these circumstances and in response to the grave concerns that you had expressed about the situation, that the Security Council, in its presidential statement of 1 November (S/PRST/1996/44), expressed its full support for your initiative to dispatch me to the Great Lakes region as your Special Envoy in order to establish the facts relating to the present conflict, to develop as a matter of urgency a plan to defuse tension and establish a ceasefire, to promote a process of negotiation and to submit advice on the mandate to be given to a United Nations Special Representative, including on the size and structure of a United Nations political presence, which, in consultation with the Governments and parties concerned, would be established in the Great Lakes region. The statement also called on you to ask me to promote the convening and encourage the adequate preparation of a conference on peace, security and development in the Great Lakes region.

2. It is important to note at the outset that in implementing the above mandate, account had to be taken of fast-moving developments in the subregion and elsewhere. Since I began my mission, important events have taken place that have helped ease some of the tension in the Great Lakes region in general and in eastern Zaire in particular.

3. The first such event was the declaration, on 4 November, by the rebel forces in eastern Zaire, of a unilateral ceasefire for a three-week period. The second was the constructive and timely statement adopted at Nairobi by the regional summit on 5 November, which, inter alia, reaffirmed the territorial integrity of Zaire and called for the cessation of hostilities as well as the deployment of a neutral force in the region. The third was the meeting I had with President Mobutu Sese Seko in Nice on 6 November. His live image on television and the subsequent account I gave to the press of the main points discussed in that meeting had a calming effect on the Zairian population, which had not seen pictures of the President since his operation. The fourth was the decision by the Security Council in its resolution 1080 (1996) to authorize the deployment of a multinational force in the region, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, for humanitarian purposes. The fifth, and

perhaps most dramatic, event was the sudden and massive return of refugees, beginning 15 November, from north Kivu into Rwanda.

4. In the light of the above, I emphasized the following objectives within my mandate:

(a) To consolidate the ceasefire and ensure its continuation beyond the declared three-week period;

(b) To provide guidance to the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in his efforts to negotiate with the parties to the conflict the channelling of urgent humanitarian assistance to the refugees and internally displaced Zairians;

(c) To facilitate the decision-making process among the countries in the region regarding the deployment of the multinational force and to develop a common understanding of its mandate and composition;

(d) To promote a political dialogue between Zaire and Rwanda;

(e) To determine the readiness of the countries in the region to participate in an international conference on peace, security and development in the region;

(f) To seek the views of the regional leaders, including the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), on the nature and mandate of a future United Nations political presence in the Great Lakes region.

5. Because of the immediate political and humanitarian crisis that was unfolding in eastern Zaire, my team and I had to devote most of our time and energy to pursuing the first five objectives, which necessitated constant shuttling, in particular, between Kigali and Kinshasa.

6. The first part of this report provides an account of the views of the leaders of the region on the crisis in eastern Zaire, on the deployment of the multinational force and on other aspects of my mandate, including the prospects for the early convening of an international conference. The second part provides a brief analysis of the current political situation as it pertains to my mandate. The last part offers some recommendations and observations on the mandate of a United Nations Special Representative for the Great Lakes region. The composition of my team and an annotated schedule of my activities in the region are appended to the present report.

II. THE VIEWS OF THE REGIONAL LEADERS

The views of the Government of Zaire

7. During my first meeting with him, in France, President Mobutu Sese Seko assured me that his country, which he believed was the victim of aggression, would do everything in its power to maintain the ceasefire. He expressed his full support for the statement adopted at the regional summit in Nairobi on

5 November. He welcomed any humanitarian assistance that would result in the early return of the refugees and would not put into question the territorial integrity of Zaire. In Kinshasa, I had a frank and constructive dialogue during my various meetings with Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo and other Government officials, including the Foreign Minister, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Defence and the two Vice-Presidents of the Transitional Parliament. Despite the prevailing feeling of being the victim of its own hospitality, the Zairian Government reaffirmed the assurances given to me by President Mobutu and declared its readiness to be as flexible as possible in order to enable urgent humanitarian assistance to reach refugees and internally displaced persons. This flexibility became increasingly evident in subsequent meetings with these officials. They welcomed the early deployment of the multinational force, which they believed would lower tension in the region. They were of the view that, however urgent and noble the humanitarian mandate of this force, its action would not be effective in the absence of peace and security in the region. They stressed that the problem posed by the Banyamulenge rebels was an internal problem that Zaire would settle on its own. In their opinion, the former Rwandese Armed Forces (ex-FAR), the Interahamwe and their political leadership should be separated from the refugees, and a solution should be found for those among them who did not wish to return voluntarily to Rwanda.

8. The idea of an international conference was not received with much enthusiasm. It was argued that sufficient time should be given to the multinational force to do its work before contemplating such a major event. Some officials, however, expressed interest in reviving the Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes Region (CEPGL). They did not rule out an informal, low-key political dialogue as one way of preparing for such a conference. In subsequent meetings, Prime Minister Kengo stated that he would consider meeting with the Rwandan leadership either bilaterally or under the auspices of a regional leader. As conditions for such a meeting, he mentioned the formal cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of foreign troops from eastern Zaire. I expressed doubts as to whether these conditions would be conducive to a meaningful dialogue. In my last meeting with him he showed some flexibility and did not insist on those preconditions.

9. When I met with President Mobutu for the second time, at the conclusion of my mission, we reviewed the latest developments since my previous meeting with him, in particular the massive return of refugees to Rwanda from eastern Zaire and the scaling down of the size of the multinational force, as well as the disquieting surge of fighting on the border between Zaire and Uganda. On the question of the regional conference, the President was of the view that the prospects of such a conference had improved and that a "Nairobi II" could be the appropriate forum, as well as a stepping stone to an international conference. Zaire, he affirmed, would attend this time. He also said that Major Buyoya should not be excluded from such a gathering, notwithstanding the sanctions imposed on Burundi. He reaffirmed his intention to return to Zaire as soon as his medical condition permitted.

The views of the Government of Rwanda

10. President Pasteur Bizimungu and Vice-President Paul Kagamé told me that Rwanda did not consider itself to be at war with Zaire. Zaire, they stressed, was at war with itself. They expressed their commitment to do everything in their power to ensure that the ceasefire by the rebels was maintained. They reaffirmed their strong desire to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of their nationals from Zaire and, to that end, promised to take concrete steps in the very near future. The leaders welcomed the deployment of a neutral force, provided its objectives remained exclusively humanitarian and the troops that comprised it came from countries that had no hidden political agenda in the region. They advised that the international community should not overestimate the strength or fighting stamina of the ex-FAR and their allies. They also expressed readiness to renew the dialogue with Zaire in order to reduce tension, but stressed that no preconditions should be set for this dialogue. As regards the international conference, they were of the view that there were enough regional and subregional forums, such as the 5 November Nairobi summit, where issues of common concern could be discussed.

11. The unexpected massive flow of refugees back into Rwanda from eastern Zaire caused Rwanda to question publicly the rationale for the multinational force. During the last meeting I had with him, President Bizimungu said that, while he welcomed the return of Rwandese refugees, Zairians of Tutsi origin who had been pushed out of eastern Zaire should return to their country.

12. During my conversations with Zairian and Rwandan officials, the United Nations and some of its agencies were criticized. Rwanda argued that what it needed was rehabilitation, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance for the returnees rather than a multinational force. President Mobutu, on the other hand, felt that the presence of a force or a Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the region would have a salutary effect. As for the headquarters of such a Representative, Nairobi was mentioned as a possibility.

The views of the Government of Uganda

13. President Yoweri Museveni was very concerned about the humanitarian and economic impact the situation in eastern Zaire was already having on his own country. He offered his good offices to help ease the tension between Rwanda and Zaire, if both countries so wished. I welcomed, in this regard, his offer to make it possible for the Rwandan and Zairian delegations to meet informally in Rome in the margins of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) summit. I subsequently learned that commendable efforts were made, but the meeting between the two, regrettably, did not take place. Zaire and Rwanda gave me conflicting reasons as to why it did not materialize.

14. In the course of subsequent telephone conversations, both Prime Minister Kengo and President Bizimungu indicated to me that they would be willing to consider a bilateral meeting under the auspices of President Mandela, if it could be arranged. I undertook to discuss this possibility with the South African leader during my meeting with him (see para. 21 below).

The views of the Government of Burundi

15. Major Buyoya said that the multinational force was welcome. He indicated that the force could use Bujumbura airport, provided his own national airlines, notwithstanding the sanctions, were allowed to fly. He described forcefully the hardships suffered by Burundi as a result of the "blockade" imposed by the neighbouring countries. He divided the latter into two groups: those who were hostile to Burundi and those who were not.

The views of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania

16. Echoing earlier criticism by Ethiopia and Kenya, President Benjamin Mkapa regretted the perceived lack of consultations in the Security Council with African States regarding the mandate and composition of the multinational force. He was satisfied with my explanation that these consultations did indeed take place and that Lieutenant General Maurice Baril, the Force Commander, had from the outset intended to include African troops and Africans in the command structure, were the force to be deployed. He welcomed the massive return of refugees to Rwanda from eastern Zaire and said that he would not send back those present in the United Republic of Tanzania without prior consultations with the Rwandan authorities.

17. Burundi was the subject of a lengthy discussion, which I also shared with Mr. Faguy. In President Mkapa's view, the problem of Burundi was the absence of a legitimate authority that could speak for the country. On the question of an international conference, he was of the view that the time was not ripe for it. He favoured a gradual approach whereby internal problems were addressed separately, while issues of common concern were discussed in regional forums. Confidence-building measures, economic cooperation and illicit traffic in small arms were mentioned as examples of issues that required a regional approach.

The views of the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity

18. The mandate and the composition of the multinational force, as well as the modalities of the contribution of African countries to that force, took the lion's share of my meeting with Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim. On the question of a political dialogue between Zaire and Rwanda, Mr. Salim encouraged me to explore further such an avenue despite my unsuccessful attempts. He welcomed the idea of involving President Mandela as facilitator of a possible meeting between Prime Minister Kengo and President Bizimungu. Regarding the internal situation in Zaire, we shared the view that President Mobutu was a vital player and should, therefore, be encouraged to return to Zaire as soon as possible. Secretary-General Salim also believed that President Mobutu could play a pivotal role as a "healer" and "reconciliator" on the issue of the Banyamulenge and other Zairians of Tutsi origin whose citizenship had been revoked.

19. On the convening of an international conference, Mr. Salim stated that such a conference should be the ultimate step crowning a series of well-prepared regional meetings such as the recent Nairobi summit. He stated that the time of a Nairobi II summit had come and that he was confident President Moi would be agreeable to chairing it, but he added that, for this second summit to be

successful, Zaire must agree to participate and Major Buyoya should be invited. At the end of the meeting, Mr. Salim expressed his support for the early appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General residing in the region. Regardless of the location of his/her office, Mr. Salim was of the view that the Special Representative must have at his/her disposal all the administrative and logistic means that would enable him/her to travel freely throughout the region.

The views of the Government of Ethiopia

20. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was of the view that if Rwanda and Zaire were left alone there would be no war. A dialogue between the two must be pursued. He would not rule out a meeting between Presidents Mobutu and Bizimungu in the near future in a neutral place in Europe. In the meantime, the countries concerned, particularly Zaire and Burundi, should be assisted in resolving their serious internal problems. President Mobutu's role in that regard was vital.

The views of the Government of South Africa

21. President Nelson Mandela was of the opinion that the matter of an international conference should best be left to the regional leaders to decide. Although it could be a costly exercise, an international conference would benefit from the added objectivity provided by the presence of international participants. As far as a Nairobi II summit was concerned, President Mandela was interested to hear about the active discussions taking place on this subject among the regional leaders. In his view, Major Buyoya should not be excluded from such a summit. As regards his role as the facilitator of a meeting between President Bizimungu and Prime Minister Kengo, President Mandela indicated that he would be willing to host such a meeting if the leaders of the subregion, as well as the countries of the Southern African Development Community, wanted him to do so. A constructive discussion of the multinational force followed, during which the President expressed his country's readiness to contribute to the force.

The views of the Government of Kenya

22. Despite repeated attempts, I was not able to meet with President Daniel Arap Moi. His busy schedule and my own unpredictable travel plans precluded such a meeting. Through my conversation with the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I was able, however, to ascertain that the idea of a Nairobi II summit had been discussed with President Moi in the margins of the summit meeting of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, held in Djibouti on 24 November. She also informed me that if the question of the participation of Zaire and Burundi (which were both absent from the last Nairobi meeting) could be resolved, a Nairobi II summit could take place some time in December.

The views of the Government of Cameroon

23. President Paul Biya expressed his disappointment at the scaling down of the multinational force. Its presence in eastern Zaire would have had a calming effect on the volatile situation there. He was encouraged by the prospect of a

Nairobi II summit, provided it was well prepared and attended by both Burundi and Zaire. The latter should be discouraged from playing the "empty chair" in regional forums. As far as Major Buyoya's attendance was concerned, it should not be viewed as a weakening of sanctions. Dialogue and sanctions were not mutually exclusive. President Biya also said that an international participation at a Nairobi II summit would be a good strategy. As regards the presence of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the region, President Biya opined that his role might be overshadowed by the presence of the multinational force. He nonetheless admitted that a United Nations presence was needed in order to encourage a political dialogue. On a temporary basis, a high-level Secretariat official could easily perform such a function until a more permanent arrangement was found.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION AS IT PERTAINS TO THE MANDATE OF THE SPECIAL ENVOY

The multinational force

24. It is evident that with the return to Rwanda of approximately 600,000 refugees, the need for the deployment of a multinational force, as envisaged in Security Council resolution 1080 (1996) has changed.

The ceasefire

25. Although the ceasefire has held for a while in most of the Kivu provinces, the continued advance by rebel forces northward and westward continues to be a major source of concern in the subregion. Zaire has once again declared its readiness to use all the means at its disposal to regain control over its territory. The fighting between Zairian and Ugandan troops on 30 November also does not bode well for peace and stability in the region.

Political dialogue

26. It is clear from my conversations with the leaders of the subregion that the desire for a political dialogue, in particular between Zaire and Rwanda, still exists. I am inclined to believe that the seeds I have sown for such a dialogue will bear fruit in the weeks to come. Many observers present at the recent Extraordinary Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Central African States, held at Brazzaville on 2 and 3 December, believe a rapprochement between Zaire and Rwanda would have occurred had Rwanda responded positively to the invitation of President Pascal Lissouba of the Congo. In this regard, it is important to note that Major Buyoya's participation in the summit seems to have not only lifted, at least temporarily, his diplomatic isolation, but also paved the way for a significant improvement in relations between Zaire and Burundi.

International conference on peace and security versus a regional summit

27. As can be seen from the accounts of the discussions I had with the leaders of the region, there is little enthusiasm for an international conference at this stage. It is no accident that there was no mention of such a conference in the 5 November declaration of the Nairobi summit. There is, however, a growing realization that the crises in Kivu and in Burundi cannot be considered merely internal matters nor dissociated from other serious problems that afflict the Great Lakes region. A consensus seems to be developing for the convening of a regional summit similar to the one held at Nairobi in early November. A number of factors favour, in my view, the convening of a Nairobi II summit at this time:

(a) President Mobutu has indicated to me that Zaire would attend such a summit;

(b) Major Buyoya would, in all likelihood, be invited;

(c) As mentioned earlier, there was a rapprochement between Zaire and Burundi during the Brazzaville summit. It is hoped by the proponents of a regional summit that a similar rapprochement can take place between Zaire and Rwanda.

IV. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE GREAT LAKES REGION

28. From the feedback I have received, it would seem that the short but intense mission I had the privilege to lead has made some difference. The mission has faithfully documented the views, aspirations and concerns of the leaders inside and outside the region and communicated them to all concerned either publicly or privately. It has helped the decision makers of the troop-contributing and other countries of the region make informed choices about the composition and mandate of the multinational force, as well as the timing of its deployment. The intense shuttling between Kigali and Kinshasa and my pronouncements about a political dialogue have contributed, in my view, to calming the situation during the tense first two weeks of my mission.

29. As explained above, while the immediate humanitarian crisis may have eased somewhat, the underlying political and military causes of instability in the region have yet to be addressed. The reported flight of over 20,000 refugees away from the border between the United Republic of Tanzania and Rwanda and deeper inland may jeopardize the voluntary repatriation of the estimated 500,000 Rwandan refugees from Tanzania. The stabilizing effects expected from the massive presence of a multinational force are now in doubt in light of the developments on the ground and the drastic scaling down of this force. As I left the region, attention was already shifting from the humanitarian crisis to the political situation in Zaire and its potentially turbulent effects on an already fragile and volatile region; hence the repeated calls by all the African leaders for the absolute need to safeguard the territorial integrity of Zaire.

30. It is largely for the above reasons that the leaders whose views I solicited believed that the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General would have a salutary effect.

31. The mandate of such a representative, the structure and location of his office and the profile of the team that should work with him/her are outlined below.

The mandate

32. As I see it now, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would need to perform the following tasks:

(a) Facilitate political dialogue and reconciliation, both at the bilateral and regional levels, and provide good offices and mediation services upon request;

(b) Assist regional leaders in the development of a common strategy for promoting dialogue and stability in the region across cultural and linguistic divides;

(c) Support all efforts aimed at promoting reconciliation in Zaire;

(d) Maintain a working relationship with all the regional leaders, the Secretary-General of OAU, President Nyerere, the Special Representatives of Canada, the European Union, and the United States, among others, as well as your Special Representative for Burundi;

(e) Provide guidance to the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator and guidance, as needed, to the Force Commander of whatever international military force may be present in the region;

(f) Promote and guide efforts aimed at the convening of an international conference for peace, security and development and participate actively in such a conference;

(g) Insofar as durable peace and security depend on the establishment and consolidation of democratic processes and participatory systems of governance, encourage national efforts aimed at developing such processes and systems.

Alternative arrangements

33. Three alternative arrangements can be envisaged for the performance of the above tasks by the Special Representative and his staff:

(a) To appoint a Special Representative who would reside in Nairobi or another appropriate location not too distant from the countries of the subregion;

(b) To appoint a roving Special Representative with no fixed home base for several months until he/she and his/her staff have developed a working

relationship with the regional leaders and earned the trust of the parties directly or indirectly involved;

(c) To appoint a Special Representative (possibly a high-level Secretariat official) who would visit the region when and as needed.

34. In order for any of the above options to be viable, the Special Representative must be provided with the necessary administrative and logistical means (including satellite communications and a small aircraft) to enable him/her to travel freely throughout the region.

35. Had the multinational force established itself in the region, including eastern Zaire, with the original strength envisaged, I would have been inclined to recommend to you option (c), at least until 31 March 1997, when the mandate of the force expires. However, given that the force deployed is quite modest, options (a) and (b) commend themselves. The only drawback of option (b) is that shuttling between African capitals, particularly at times of crisis, would be a taxing proposition no matter how physically fit the Special Representative and his/her team are or how fully equipped and mobile the office may be. If, for compelling reasons, options (a) or (b) cannot be implemented immediately, I strongly suggest that you consider option (c), so as not to lose the goodwill and momentum generated by my short mission.

United Nations presence in Zaire and Rwanda

36. Although I see merit in establishing satellite offices in both Rwanda and Zaire, time and effort would be needed to persuade both countries to accept such offices. Zaire considers the turmoil in the Kivu region to be an internal problem and wants to deal with it on its own. Rwanda has its hands full with the massive return of refugees and has stressed that what it needs most is assistance with the economic and social reintegration of these refugees. This, however, should not preclude the establishment of such offices at a later stage, nor should it prevent, if developments warrant it, the strengthening of the United Nations electoral office in Kinshasa, which I understand has been providing valuable services to the National Electoral Commission.

The size and structure of the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

37. In addition to the Special Representative, it is my considered opinion that the team should have at least the following staff:

(a) One senior political adviser at the director level (D-2) who would act as officer-in-charge in the absence of the Special Representative and would periodically be dispatched from the home base to one or more countries of the region on special assignment;

(b) A deputy to the political adviser at the D-1 level;

(c) Two political affairs officers, one of whom would also serve as spokesperson;

(d) Two liaison officers for humanitarian and human rights issues;

(e) A logistics/communications officer;

(f) An administrative officer;

(g) A personal/administrative assistant to the Special Representative;

(h) Two secretaries, two security officers and other support staff as needed.

38. The political staff must have excellent communication skills in English and French and should be familiar with the theory and practice of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking.

39. In addition to impeccable linguistic skills, the Special Representative should be a well-known and internationally respected figure with the intellectual capacity and diplomatic skills to help develop a consensus on the nature of and solutions for the problems that afflict the countries of the Great Lakes region.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

40. I wish to conclude this report by extending to the Secretary-General my sincere gratitude for entrusting me with this challenging assignment and for greatly facilitating my task by writing and speaking in advance to all the leaders of the region. My heartfelt thanks go to my own country, Canada, for its leadership at a critical time and for providing me with valuable logistical support. Last, but not least, I wish to thank the members of my team for their indefatigable support throughout this intense, but most rewarding, mission and to express my fervent hope that the population of the Great Lakes region of central Africa may find peace.

Appendix

Mission of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to the Great Lakes region

Composition of the team

Mr. Raymond Chrétien	Ambassador of Canada to the United States of America Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region
Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello	United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for the Great Lakes Region
Mr. Youssef Mahmoud	Senior Political Adviser
Mr. Georges Rioux	Political Affairs Officer/Spokesperson
Mr. Michel N. Kassa	Political Affairs Officer
Ms. Angelica Malic	Administrative Assistant

Appendix II

[Original: French]

Mission of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to the Great Lakes region

Schedule

Tuesday, 5 November 1996

WASHINGTON, D.C.

7 a.m.	Departure from Andrews Air Force Base

SANTA MARIA

12.05 p.m.	Stopover
12.55 p.m.	Departure

NICE

10.30 p.m.	Arrival in Nice (Hotel Westminster-Concorde)

Wednesday, 6 November

Morning:	Consultations with the Office of President Mobutu
4.30 p.m.	Private meeting with President Mobutu at Villa del Mare
6 p.m.	Press conference at Hotel Alexandra

Thursday, 7 November

8 a.m.	Departure for Nairobi via Cairo

CAIRO

11.15 a.m.	Stopover
12.20 p.m.	Departure

NAIROBI

7.30 p.m.	Arrival in Nairobi (Hotel Safari Club)
8.30 p.m.	Meeting with Mr. Felix Mosha, political adviser to President/Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, Mediator for Burundi

Friday, 8 November

10 a.m.	Departure for Kigali
KIGALI	
11 a.m.	Arrival in Kigali: press conference at the airport
12.30 p.m.	Meeting with the diplomatic corps at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) office
2.15 p.m.	Meeting at the Office of the President with President Pasteur Bizimungu and Mr. Paul Kagamé, Vice-President and Minister of Defence
3.30 p.m.	Press conference with President Bizimungu at his Office
4 p.m.	Press conference at the airport
4.30 p.m.	Departure for Kinshasa
KINSHASA	
6.30 p.m.	Arrival in Kinshasa (Hotel Inter-Continental)

Saturday, 9 November

9 a.m.	Meeting with Mr. Kititwa Tumansi, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs
	Meeting with Grand Admiral Mavua Mudima, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence
1 p.m.	Meeting with Mr. Kengo wa Dondo, Prime Minister
2 p.m.	Meeting with Mr. Gerard Kamanda wa Kamanda, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior
6 p.m.	Meeting with Mr. Tshisekedi
6.45 p.m.	Meeting with Admiral Mudima and Deputy Prime Minister Kamanda on the humanitarian assistance situation
	[Adoption of the first Security Council resolution: 1078 (1996)]

Sunday, 10 November

9.50 a.m.	Departure for Kampala
KAMPALA	
3.30 p.m.	Arrival in Entebbe
4 p.m.	Meeting with President Yoweri Museveni
6.30 p.m.	Departure for Kigali
KIGALI	
8.30 p.m.	Arrival in Kigali (Hotel Umubano)

Monday, 11 November

9.30 a.m.	Meeting with the humanitarian mission of the European troika headed by Ms. Emma Bonino
11.15 a.m.	Second meeting with President Pasteur Bizimungu and Mr. Paul Kagamé
12.30 p.m.	Joint press conference with President Bizimungu
3.30 p.m.	Telephone conversation with Prime Minister Kengo

[Ministerial meeting of the Central Organ of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution]

Tuesday, 12 November

Noon	Meeting with President Bizimungu
4.30 p.m.	Departure from Kigali

KINSHASA

6 p.m.	Arrival in Kinshasa (Hotel Inter-Continental)

Wednesday, 13 November

11 a.m.	Second meeting with Mr. Kititwa Tumansi, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs
Noon	Second meeting with Prime Minister Léon Kengo wa Dondo
12.45 p.m.	Press briefing with Prime Minister Kengo
4.30 p.m.	Talk with Mr. Kamanda wa Kamanda, Minister of the Interior
7.30 p.m.	Press conference at the Hotel Inter-Continental

Thursday, 14 November

10 a.m.	Talk with Mr. Boboliko, Vice-President of the High Council of the Republic and the Transitional Parliament (HCR/PT)
11 a.m.	Talk with Mr. Bembé, Vice-President of HCR/PT
12.30 p.m.	Meeting with the diplomatic corps of the European Union at the UNDP office
2.30 p.m.	Meeting with Mr. Nicod, Director of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Zaire
6 p.m.	Third meeting with Prime Minister Kengo

Friday, 15 November

10.45 a.m.	Departure from Kinshasa

[Refugees begin to cross the Rwanda-Zaire border]

BUJUMBURA

Noon	Arrival in Bujumbura (Hotel Novotel)
2 p.m.	Meeting with Mr. Marc Faguy, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Burundi
5 p.m.	Talk with Major Pierre Buyoya, President of Burundi, at his Office
6.45 p.m.	Press briefing at the Office of the President
7.30 p.m.	Dinner given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Guests: the Director-General for Europe and North America and international organizations, the Diplomatic Counsellor to the President, and the Chief of Protocol
10.30 p.m.	Telephone conversations with New York to discuss the Security Council resolution that Rwanda is seeking to block because refugees began to cross the border on Friday morning
	[Adoption of Security Council resolution 1080 (1996) authorizing the deployment of a multinational force]

Saturday, 16 November

9 a.m.	Breakfast/meeting at the residence of the dean of the diplomatic corps, the Ambassador of Egypt, with the diplomatic corps in Bujumbura
10.30 a.m.	Departure for Kigali

KIGALI

11.40 a.m.	Arrival in Kigali (Hotel Umubano)
8.30-10 p.m.	Meeting with President Bizimungu (at Hotel Umubano)
10.30 p.m.	Telephone conversation with Lieutenant-General Maurice Baril

Sunday, 17 November

9 a.m.	Telephone conversation with President Julius Nyerere
10 a.m.	Telephone conversation with President Pierre Buyoya
	Staff meetings

Monday, 18 November

Noon	Departure for Dar-es-Salaam

DAR-ES-SALAAM

2 p.m.	Arrival in Dar-es-Salaam
3 p.m.	Briefing at UNDP office
4 p.m.	Meeting with President Benjamin Mpaka
5 p.m.	Press briefing at the Office of the President
7 p.m.	Departure from Dar-es-Salaam

KIGALI

8 p.m. Return to Kigali

Tuesday, 19 November

8.30 a.m. Pick up General Baril at the airport
Three-hour meeting with the Lieutenant-General at the Canadian Consul's residence
3 p.m. Debriefing by General Baril on his meeting with Vice-President and Minister of Defence Paul Kagamé
3.45 p.m. Press conference at the airport
4 p.m. Departure from Kigali

KINSHASA

6.30 p.m. Arrival in Kinshasa

Wednesday, 20 November

2-7 p.m. Series of meetings with the Ministers of Defence, Interior and Foreign Affairs
7 p.m. Meeting with Prime Minister Kengo and Lieutenant-General Baril at the Prime Minister's residence
8 p.m. Departure of the Lieutenant-General for Entebbe

[Replacement of General Eluki, Chief of the General Staff of the Zairian armed forces]

Thursday, 21 November

1.30 p.m. Meeting with the Norwegian envoy, Ambassador Toraasen
2-3.30 p.m. Meeting with members of Parliament from South Kivu
3.30-5 p.m. Meeting with members of Parliament from North Kivu

[Tshisekedi meets with President Mobutu in Nice]

Friday, 22 November

9 a.m. Private meeting with Prime Minister Kengo
9.45 a.m. Press briefing at the Office of the Prime Minister

[Tshisekedi proclaims himself Prime Minister on Radio France International, a senior staff member in President Mobutu's Office denies the report]

11 a.m. Departure from Kinshasa

ADDIS ABABA

5 p.m. Arrival in Addis Ababa (Hilton Hotel)
6.15-8.15 p.m. Meeting with Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity

Saturday, 23 November

3 p.m. Meeting with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi

Sunday, 24 November

6 p.m. Dinner with the diplomatic corps at the residence of the regional representative of UNHCR, Mr. David Lambo

Monday, 25 November

Private talks with OAU and Ethiopian Government officials

Tuesday, 26 November

10 a.m. Telephone conversation with President Bizimungu
11.30 a.m. Departure for Nairobi

NAIROBI

4 p.m. Arrival in Nairobi (Grand Regency Hotel)

5.30-7.30 p.m. Reception with the diplomatic corps (17 ambassadors) at the residence of the High Commissioner of Canada, Mr. Bernard Dussault

Wednesday, 27 November

Noon Departure for Pretoria

PRETORIA

6 p.m. Arrival in Pretoria (Kloof House)

Thursday, 28 November

12.30 p.m. Luncheon hosted by the High Commissioner of Canada, Mr. Arthur Perron
7 p.m. Dinner hosted by High Commissioner Perron attended by the diplomatic corps (8) at his residence in Johannesburg

Friday, 29 November

9 a.m.	Meeting with President Nelson Mandela
11 a.m.	Meeting with Mr. Honoré Ngbanda, Special Adviser to President Mobutu, at the office of the High Commissioner of Canada
12.15 p.m.	Working lunch hosted by the Director-General of Foreign Affairs with the South African Government Task Force for the Great Lakes region, at the home of the Minister
3 p.m.	Meeting with Mr. Thabo Mbeki, Vice-President of South Africa, at the Union Building
4 p.m.	Joint press conference with Mr. Mbeki

Saturday, 30 November

10 a.m.	Departure from Johannesburg

ENTEBBE

1.30 p.m.	Stopover Visit to multinational force headquarters
2.30 p.m.	Departure for Yaoundé

YAOUNDE

5 p.m.	Arrival in Yaoundé (Hotel Mont Fébé)
7 p.m.	Reception at the residence of the High Commissioner of Canada in Cameroon, Mr. Pierre Giguère

Sunday, 1 December

11 a.m.	Private meeting with President Paul Biya
12.50 p.m.	Press briefing at the Office of the President
1.50 p.m.	Departure from Yaoundé

DAKAR

6 p.m.	Arrival in Dakar (Hotel President-Meridien)

Monday, 2 December

10 a.m.	Meeting with President Abdou Diouf
Noon	Press briefing at the official residence of the High Commissioner of Canada
2.30 p.m.	Departure for Nice

NICE

8 p.m.	Arrival in Nice (Hotel Alexandra)

Tuesday, 3 December

Telephone consultations and preparations for the 4 December meeting

Wednesday, 4 December

11.30 a.m. Meeting with President Mobutu at his residence in Cap Martin-Villa del Mare

2.30 p.m. Press conference at the Hotel Alexandra in Cap Martin

Thursday, 5 December

10 a.m. Departure from Nice

WASHINGTON, D.C.

3 p.m. Arrival at Andrews Air Force Base

Wednesday, 11 December

NEW YORK

5 p.m. Meeting with the Secretary-General of the United Nations to submit report

Thursday, 12 December

3.30 p.m. Security Council briefing